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MASS TORTS AND THE PURSUIT
OF ETHICAL FINALITY
Lynn A. Baker*
INTRODUCTION
Judges, lawyers, and academics largely agree that comprehensive finality
is a central goal of mass tort litigation and settlements. More controversial
is whether such finality is normatively preferable, inherently ethically
problematic, or can be achieved through nonclass aggregate settlements
without running afoul of the existing ethics rules. This Article joins this
important debate.
Part I explains the special allure and complexity of finality in nonclass
aggregate settlements for defendants, plaintiffs, and plaintiffs’ counsel.
Part II sets out five core components of comprehensive finality commonly
sought in these settlements. These core components include (1) minimum
participation thresholds and affirmations by plaintiffs’ counsel that they (2)
will cease advertising for new clients with similar claims against the
defendant; (3) will not represent any new, similar claimants; (4) will
recommend participation in the settlement to all clients; and (5) will (seek
judicial permission to) withdraw from representing any client who declines
his or her settlement offer. This part also discusses the limitations that the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility (“the Rules of
Professional Responsibility” or “the Rules”) currently impose on each
component and the extent to which comprehensive finality is currently
achievable as a practical matter. It also provides a critical analysis of
critiques of the ethics and desirability of each component recently offered
* Frederick M. Baron Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law. This Article was
prepared for the colloquium entitled Civil Litigation Ethics at a Time of Vanishing Trials,
hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics on October 21,
2016, at Fordham University School of Law. Special thanks to Bruce Green and Sherri
Levine for inviting me to participate in the conference. I am grateful for valuable comments
on earlier drafts provided by Richard Arsenault, Scott Cummings, Howard Erichson, Susan
Fortney, Bruce Green, Adam Hoeflich, Alexi Lahav, Andrew Pollis, Morris Ratner, Teddy
Rave, Judith Resnik, Norm Spaulding, Andrew Zimmerman, and Ben Zipursky. I also
presented early drafts of this Article at the Law and Economics Workshop at Tel Aviv
University Buchman Faculty of Law on December 7, 2016, the International Legal Ethics
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by various scholars. Part III argues, notwithstanding these critiques, that
comprehensive finality in nonclass aggregate settlements is both desirable
and largely achievable within existing ethical constraints. This Article
concludes by proposing an amendment to ABA Model Rule of Professional
Responsibility 5.6 that would relax the major problematic constraint and
thereby arguably benefit defendants, plaintiffs, and plaintiffs’ counsel
involved in such settlements.
I. THE SPECIAL ALLURE AND COMPLEXITY
OF COMPREHENSIVE FINALITY IN MASS TORTS
For both plaintiffs and defendants, resolution is the goal of litigation. In
mass tort litigation, however, the goal is not only resolution but
comprehensive finality, which has special allure and presents special
complexity for the parties. For a mass tort defendant, the large number of
claims involved means large potential liability and, therefore, a large
potential “cloud” on the company’s accounting ledgers and share price.
The incentives for the defendant to resolve all claims and thereby remove
the cloud are clear.1 For the mass tort plaintiffs (and their contingent fee
counsel), the special allure of comprehensive finality rests in the “finality
premium” that the defendant can be expected to pay in exchange for true
In addition, plaintiffs’ counsel may benefit from
global peace.2
comprehensive resolution insofar as it provides them closure regarding
ongoing expenditures of time and money needed to prosecute their clients’
claims against the defendant.3
The allure of comprehensive finality for mass tort defendants, plaintiffs,
and plaintiffs’ counsel is straightforward. Achieving this finality, however,
1. Indeed, simply obtaining certainty as to the actual total cost of resolving all claims is
useful for the defendant (and valuable for its shareholders), even if that total cost is
significant. To take one notable example, on the day Merck announced its $4.85 billion
nationwide settlement of nearly 50,000 Vioxx claims in November 2007, its stock rose 2.3
percent “even as the broader stock market was sharply lower.” Alex Berenson, Analysts See
Merck Victory in Vioxx Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2007, at A1 [hereinafter Berenson,
Analysts]. Interpreting such data is complicated, however. The increase in the defendant’s
share price upon announcement of a settlement might reflect a lower-than-expected total
settlement amount, the savings in ongoing defense costs, and/or a rebound from a decline in
the share price earlier in the litigation process. See, e.g., id. (noting that “[t]wo years ago,
some analysts estimated that Merck would have to pay as much as $25 billion to settle Vioxx
claims” and that settling the cases enabled Merck “to stop spending $600 million a year on
its defense”); Alex Berenson, Jury Calls Merck Liable in Death of Man on Vioxx, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2006, at A1 (noting that the first trial of a personal injury case involving
Vioxx resulted in a jury verdict of $253.5 million and caused Merck shares to fall 7.7
percent).
2. See Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement
Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 760, 760–63 (1997) (detailing reasons why defendants
who settle group lawsuits “want finality and are willing to pay for it”); see also Howard M.
Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 318–
20 (2011); Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the
Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 412–18 (2014).
3. A partial settlement can leave a plaintiff’s firm or consortium with ongoing
expenditures of time and money as it continues to prosecute the unsettled claims against the
defendant.
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is complicated.
A mass tort defendant has numerous complex
considerations when deciding how best to resolve the many pending claims.
A series of confidential, incremental, “global” settlements with individual
law firms or consortia is one option. The incremental approach runs the
risk that plaintiffs’ attorneys receiving early settlements may use some of
the proceeds to fund advertising for, and pretrial discovery related to,
additional claims, thereby increasing the eventual number of viable claims
and potentially the total amount to be paid by the defendant. Similarly,
ordinary media publicity surrounding the early settlements may
independently cause additional potential claimants to hire an attorney and
pursue their claims. A comprehensive, “nationwide” settlement program is
another option. Although it may provide some of the same incentives for
additional claimants to join the litigation, it will typically have a deadline
for participation, which, as a practical matter, will cap the total number of
claims to be paid.4
Independently of the total number of claims ultimately paid under either
settlement option, the incremental approach may enable the defendant to
resolve groups of claims for some law firms at a lower per-claim average
value than for others.5 This approach may reduce the defendant’s total cost
of settling all claims relative to a nationwide settlement program if one
assumes that the select group of plaintiffs’ counsel negotiating a nationwide
settlement program are likely to be among the best bargainers and from the
most well-capitalized law firms.6
Whether a defendant ultimately negotiates a public, nationwide
settlement program, as in Vioxx,7 or enters into multiple, confidential
4. A deadline for participation may cap the total number of claims as a practical matter
simply because stragglers who later seek to hire counsel may find few, if any, interested
plaintiffs’ attorneys. From the perspective of a contingent fee plaintiffs’ attorney, the
litigation costs, general transaction costs, and opportunity costs of such a belated individual
representation are likely to exceed any potential recovery. In some instances, the statute of
limitations may have run, providing the defendant a useful hard stop to the number of
potential claimants.
5. The comparison here is between similar claims across different law firms or
consortia, such that the variable is the law firm or consortium rather than characteristics or
qualities of the total inventory of claims represented by each.
6. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in
Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 13, 19, 34), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2724637 (providing empirical data that
“[w]hen judges consider applicants for [multidistrict litigation] leadership positions, they
focus on experience, cooperative tendencies, and an ability to finance the litigation—factors
that favor repeat players,” that “attorneys with more appearances in proceedings are more
likely to be appointed to leadership positions, and those in leadership design settlements,”
and “settlement values may likewise reflect repeat players’ knowledge about previous
awards, which helps prevent defendants from using information asymmetries to their
advantage” (footnote omitted)) [https://perma.cc/XRK5-LWDB].
7. See Settlement Agreement, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-md-1657 (E.D.
La. Nov. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Vioxx Settlement], http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/
documents/Master%20Settlement%20Agreement%20-%20new.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9B5DXHM]. The Vioxx settlement was most notable and the second earliest of the relatively
few public, nonclass, personal injury aggregate settlements to date. For a list of the handful
of other public, aggregate settlements, see Burch & Williams, supra note 6. There have been
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“inventory” settlements with individual law firms or consortia of firms,8 it
will need to work with the relevant plaintiffs’ counsel to craft a written
settlement agreement. Under either model of mass resolution, the
settlement agreement will reflect both parties’ pursuit of comprehensive
finality and its expected benefits for the defendant and the relevant group of
claimants. The next part takes up five core components of comprehensive
finality that one might expect to see in an optimally comprehensive mass
tort settlement agreement.
II. FIVE CORE COMPONENTS OF COMPREHENSIVE FINALITY
IN NONCLASS MASS TORT SETTLEMENTS
From the perspective of the mass tort defendant, an optimally
comprehensive nonclass settlement likely would include five provisions in
the agreement negotiated with the relevant plaintiffs’ counsel9: (1) that the
defendant has a unilateral option to terminate the settlement unless a
specified number of claimants agree to participate in the settlement (a
“walk-away” right or minimum participation threshold) and that the
signatory plaintiffs’ attorney(s) will (2) recommend participation in the
settlement to all potentially eligible clients, (3) not represent any new
clients with similar claims against the defendant, (4) not advertise for new
clients with similar claims against the defendant, and (5) (seek judicial
permission to) withdraw from representing any client who declines his or
her settlement offer under the agreement.
From the perspective of the claimant, a settlement offer under an
agreement that the mass tort defendant considers optimally comprehensive
is likely to be larger than an offer under a similar agreement that lacks the
above five restrictions. The defendant should be willing to pay a premium
for the finality provided by the optimally comprehensive settlement.10
Indeed, even an ABA formal ethics opinion critical of one such restriction
explicitly acknowledges “the fact that the defendant is willing to offer more

vastly more personal injury mass torts resolved via multiple confidential inventory
settlements.
8. Some “confidential” inventory settlement agreements are publicly available in
redacted form as a result of being filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. See,
e.g., Master Settlement Agreement § IV.H, In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys.
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-md-2325 (S.D. W. Va. June 14, 2013) [hereinafter AMS
Settlement],
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1100962/000110096213000038/
ex10144meshsettlementagree.htm [https://perma.cc/7CLF-THUY].
9. Claimants covered by a settlement agreement will often be represented by multiple
law firms that agree to share the fees that the claimant has contracted to pay pursuant to the
attorney-client retainer agreement. Typically, only one (or a small subset) of those law firms
is a direct signatory to the mass tort settlement agreement under which the claimant receives
a settlement offer. This is true in both inventory settlements and in nationwide settlement
programs.
10. Silver & Baker, supra note 2, at 760–63 (detailing reasons why defendants who
settle group lawsuits “want finality and are willing to pay for it”).
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consideration than it might otherwise offer in order to secure the covenant
from the attorney not to represent” new clients.11
If both the mass tort defendant and claimants prefer a nonclass settlement
with the five provisions set out above, one might expect virtually all
settlement agreements to include these provisions. At present, however, the
Rules of Professional Responsibility limit, to varying degrees, the ability of
counsel for both sides to include such provisions in the agreements they
craft.12 This part takes up each of the five provisions in turn, discusses the
limitations that the Rules of Professional Responsibility currently impose
on each, and examines the extent to which comprehensive finality is
(nonetheless) currently achievable as a practical matter. It also provides a
critical analysis of existing critiques of the ethics and desirability of each
component.
A. Minimum Participation Threshold
The minimum participation threshold (or “walk-away” right) in a
settlement agreement typically takes one of two forms. Sometimes the
agreement will state that “the Defendant shall have the right, in its sole
discretion, to terminate this settlement if XX percent of the Claimants who
are eligible to settle their claims under this agreement do not provide a
valid, executed Release on or before the deadline of Day/Month/Year.”13
Other times, this provision may impose different participation thresholds on
claimants in two or more different injury categories, with a failure to meet
any one of the thresholds affording the defendant the option to unilaterally
terminate the agreement.14 Typically, a significant participation rate,
sometimes as high as 100 percent, is required for the subgroup of claimants
with the highest valued claims (and most serious injuries), with the lowest
participation rate required for the subgroup with the lowest valued claims
(and least serious injuries).
Such walk-away provisions are unproblematic under the Rules of
Professional Responsibility. There are no state bar or ABA ethics opinions
questioning the permissibility of such provisions. Nor is there any such
case law. This is not surprising. A participation threshold is simply a
11. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-371 (1993)
(emphasis added) (regarding restrictions on the right to represent clients in the future).
12. Possible answers to the fascinating question of why the Rules interfere in this way
are beyond the scope of this Article.
13. See, e.g., AMS Settlement, supra note 8, at 11.
14. The “walk-away” provisions of the Vioxx settlement agreement were yet another
variant of this form. See Vioxx Settlement, supra note 7, §§ 11.1–.4, 12.1.1–.1.6. The
Vioxx agreement imposed separate participation requirements on various subgroups of
claimants, but each subgroup was required to meet the same 85 percent participation
requirement. See id. § 11.1.1–.1.4. In addition, the Vioxx agreement provided a walk-away
right to the defendant if certain attorneys did not recommend that their clients participate in
the nationwide settlement program established by the settlement agreement and did not
otherwise comply with particular sections of the agreement. See id. § 11.1.5. Distinguishing
among particular plaintiffs’ counsel in this way is of potential interest to the defendant (and
logically possible) only in an agreement establishing a nationwide settlement program rather
than an agreement to settle only the “inventory” of a particular law firm.
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bargaining point between the defendant and plaintiffs’ counsel, much like
the total dollar amount of the settlement or any other material term of the
settlement agreement. A participation threshold in a master settlement
agreement is ultimately no different from a defendant telling plaintiffs’
counsel that if the latter can provide signed releases from X percent or X
number of claimants on the attached list that it will then agree to a
settlement of those claims for no less than $Y (or for a total amount of $Z
per such release tendered). That is, a defendant could simply decline to
enter into a formal agreement to settle any of the plaintiffs’ counsel’s claims
until the plaintiffs’ counsel took a “straw poll” of sorts and could provide
the defendant appropriate proof that a specified number of claimants would
agree to settle for a total, specified sum.
Nonetheless, as participation thresholds approach 100 percent, they are
increasingly controversial and are considered ethically problematic by some
legal scholars. Professor Howard Erichson, for example, contends that “allor-nothing” provisions “create both client-client and lawyer-client conflicts
of interest” and thus violate Rule 1.7(a)(2)’s prohibition against certain
representations, which present “a significant risk that the representation of
one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s
responsibilities to another client . . . or by a personal interest of the
lawyer.”15 For Erichson, a client-client conflict is created by a 100 percent
participation requirement insofar as the “decision of some clients to decline
the settlement impairs the ability of other clients to get the deal done.”16
The attorney-client conflict arises in two respects. First, “the client-client
conflict makes it extremely difficult for a lawyer to give unbiased counsel
to a client who wishes to decline the offer” if the settlement agreement
requires 100 percent participation.17 And a 100 percent participation
15. Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 KAN. L. REV.
979, 1007 (2010) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2009)). Rule 1.7 specifies that such representations are permitted if all of the following
conditions are met:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client; (2) the representation
is not prohibited by law; (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a
claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same
litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and (4) each affected client gives
informed consent, confirmed in writing.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
Erichson distinguishes “most-or-nothing” settlements with “walkaway clauses
requiring 85, 90, or 95% participation” from “all-or-nothing” settlements, and contends that
the former “raise far fewer ethical concerns than those that require unanimity.” Erichson,
supra, at 1023–24.
16. Erichson, supra note 15, at 1008 (footnotes omitted). Although Erichson is less
troubled by the client-client and lawyer-client conflicts of interest in settlements with a
participation requirement of less than 100 percent, he notes that even settlements that
“include the safety valve of permitting some clients to decline their share of the settlement
without spoiling the deal for the other clients and for their lawyer” present these conflicts of
interest. Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1769, 1798 (2005).
17. Erichson, supra note 15, at 1008. Assuming arguendo that this difficulty exists, it
does not obviate the lawyer’s obligation under Rule 2.1 to “exercise independent
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threshold “pit[s] the lawyer’s interest in closing the deal against the
interests of any client[] who might wish to decline the settlement,” thereby
“putting the lawyer’s fee at risk.”18
None of Erichson’s concerns is persuasive. To begin, the client-client
conflict that he contends is created in its most extreme form by a 100
percent participation threshold is both waivable and indeed must be waived
for the group settlement to proceed. It is arguably waivable under Rule
1.7(b), which provides in relevant part that a concurrent conflict is
permissible if “the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able
to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client”
and “each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.”19
Even more relevant, however, is Rule 1.8(g).20 As Erichson notes, any
participation threshold creates an “interdependence” or “collective
conditionality” among claims.21 This means that the settlement is arguably
an “aggregate settlement,” and therefore Rule 1.8(g) applies.22 As I have
previously explained, Rule 1.8(g)
usefully supplements Rule 1.7. Rule 1.8(g) makes clear that aggregate
settlements are ethically permissible and that the plaintiffs’ attorney may
ethically participate in the “making” of such settlements . . . . The Rule
also provides some detail about the content of the disclosures necessary in
order for the attorney to obtain a client’s informed consent to such a
settlement. Put differently, Rule 1.8(g) provides a safe harbor for
attorneys concerned that an aggregate settlement creates a non-waivable
conflict under Rule 1.7. It does not impose any new requirements on an
attorney beyond those imposed by the other rules, but rather charts a path

professional judgment and render candid advice” to the client. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 2.1. Erichson concedes that “[w]hen a settlement contains a walkaway clause
that conditions the deal upon 85% or 90% participation, the conflict is relatively mild
because of the safety valve that permits a number of clients to decline the settlement without
blowing the deal for everyone else.” Erichson, supra note 15, at 1008. Thus, Erichson’s
primary concern is with what he terms “all-or-nothing” settlements. Id. at 980 (“All-ornothing settlements . . . cause a lot of mischief.”).
18. Erichson, supra note 15, at 1009. Erichson acknowledges that this attorney-client
conflict exists even in settlements with participation thresholds of less than 100 percent.
Erichson, supra note 16, at 1798 (“A settlement with a walk-away provision set at ninetynine percent, for example, functions almost identically to an all-or-nothing settlement in that
the lawyer has a strong self-interest in ensuring that virtually every client accepts the deal,
and clients who favor the settlement are pitted against those who do not.”).
19. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(1), (b)(4).
20. Rule 1.8(g) states in relevant part that a
lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an
aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients . . . unless each client
gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer’s disclosure
shall include the existence and nature of all the claims . . . involved and of the
participation of each person in the settlement.
Id. r. 1.8(g).
21. Erichson, supra note 15, at 1008 (“Client-client conflicts occur whenever a deal is
conditioned on terms that make clients’ settlements interdependent.”).
22. Id. at 1008 n.172 (citing, among other sources, Erichson, supra note 16, at 1796–99).
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by which the plaintiffs’ attorney can provide clients the benefits of a nonclass-action group settlement without running afoul of Rule 1.7.23

Thus, any client-client conflict created by a participation threshold does not
render the participation threshold itself unethical or unenforceable, even if
100 percent participation is required. Rather, the resulting conflict is
waivable, and will be waived by settling clients, pursuant to the disclosure
and consent requirements of Rule 1.8(g).
The attorney-client conflicts that Erichson contends result in their most
extreme form from a 100 percent participation threshold also do not make
the threshold unethical. As with the client-client conflicts, these conflicts
too are waivable under Rule 1.7(b) and will be waived by settling clients
pursuant to the disclosure and consent requirements of Rule 1.8(g). In
addition, Erichson’s concerns with the impact of a 100 percent participation
threshold on the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees have things exactly backward.
Erichson is correct that any participation threshold (like any other
obligation in the settlement agreement) puts the plaintiffs’ lawyer’s fee at
risk: if the threshold isn’t met, there may be no settlement and, therefore,
no fee for the contingent fee plaintiffs’ attorney.24 Erichson correctly
concedes that “[a]rguably, a lawyer-client conflict exists whenever a
contingent fee lawyer advises a single client about a settlement because the
lawyer’s fee may depend on the client’s decision” and “that level of conflict
is inherent in virtually every [contingent fee] lawyer-client relationship.”25
Where he errs is in his conclusion that the attorney’s risk of losing the fee is
greater in the aggregate settlement context than in the single-client
representation.26 To be sure, the total fee involved will typically be much
greater in the aggregate settlement.27 But the likelihood that the attorney
receives no fee is significantly greater in the single-client representation.
In the single-client representation, there will be no settlement and
therefore no fee for the contingent fee attorney if the client declines the
settlement offer.28 In the aggregate settlement context, however, the
decision of any one client to decline the settlement offer will not derail the
settlement, even if the settlement agreement gives the defendant the option
23. Lynn A. Baker, Aggregate Settlements and Attorney Liability: The Evolving
Landscape, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291, 317–18 (2015) (footnotes omitted). Comment 13
(“Aggregate Settlements”) to Rule 1.8 is consistent with my analysis. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 13.
[Rule 1.8(g)] is a corollary of [Rules 1.7 and 1.2(a)] and provides that, before any
settlement offer . . . is made or accepted on behalf of multiple clients, the lawyer
must inform each of them about all the material terms of the settlement, including
what the other clients will receive . . . if the settlement . . . is accepted.
Id.
24. See Erichson, supra note 15, at 1009.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 1009–10. (“What makes the all-or-nothing settlement troubling is the
extent to which it ups the ante on the lawyer-client conflict by making the entire deal, and
potentially the lawyer’s entire fee, subject to the decision of each individual client.”).
27. See id. at 1009.
28. Rule 1.2(a) is clear that “[a] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to
settle a matter.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2.
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to terminate the settlement if 100 percent of the eligible clients do not
accept their settlement offers. Consider a hypothetical settlement involving
1,000 claimants and a 100 percent participation threshold. If the plaintiffs’
attorney is able to obtain releases from “only” 999 of the claimants, will a
self-interested defendant’s best course of action really be to terminate the
settlement and continue litigating against the 1,000 claimants rather than
have prompt, final resolution of the claims of the 999 claimants willing to
settle? In my nearly two decades of experience as a consultant on dozens of
actual large-group, large-dollar, mass tort settlements, I have never seen a
defendant terminate a settlement in which the specified participation
threshold, whether 100 percent or less, was not met.
If defendants do not enforce these participation thresholds, one might
wonder why they are keen to include them in aggregate settlement
agreements. The answer is presumably that these provisions impose a kind
of “best efforts” obligation on plaintiffs’ counsel to maximize the
participation of their clients in the settlement. The thresholds do afford the
defendant the opportunity to ask the plaintiffs’ counsel hard questions about
which clients are declining their settlement offers and why. And the
defendant does have the option to terminate the settlement if it is ultimately
uncomfortable with the number or injury categories of the claimants
declining their settlement offers or the reasons reported by the plaintiffs’
counsel for those claimants’ failure to participate in the settlement.
In any event, the fact that defendants regularly waive their contractual
right to terminate aggregate settlements in which the participation threshold
is not met means that Erichson’s concern is misplaced: the plaintiffs’
lawyers do not “stand[] to lose millions of dollars if any client says no.”29
These lawyers will typically simply make a bit less in fees if 999 claimants,
rather than 1,000, accept their settlement offers under the aggregate
agreement.30 Rather, it is the lawyer representing a single client who risks
making nothing and whose entire fee depends on a lone client’s willingness
to accept the settlement offer.31
Finally, it is important to appreciate that in deciding whether to accept a
settlement offer the client in an aggregate settlement is in a very different
position than a client in a non-mass tort, single-client representation.32 For
29. Erichson, supra note 15, at 1009.
30. Most aggregate settlement agreements, even those that specify a 100 percent
participation requirement, also stipulate the portion of the total settlement fund to be rebated
to the defendant in the event that the participation threshold is not met but the defendant
nonetheless proceeds with the settlement. See, e.g., AMS Settlement, supra note 8, at 11
(providing that if the distribution threshold is not met by the specified date, the defendant has
the option to either void the entire agreement or receive “the return of the Individual
Allocated Amount . . . for only those Claimants below the ninety-five percent (95%)
Distribution Threshold”).
31. Cf. supra note 26 (“What makes the all-or-nothing settlement troubling is the extent
to which it ups the ante on the lawyer-client conflict by making the entire deal, and
potentially the lawyer’s entire fee, subject to the decision of each individual client.”).
32. I am assuming that the single-client representation involves a type of case that is
typically free standing and litigated on its own, unlike a mass tort case, which may be one of
hundreds or thousands of claims arising from the same event or allegedly defective product.
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each of these clients, the issue is one of realistic alternatives. In a non-mass
tort, single-client representation, the client will often have more bargaining
power with the defendant. If the client does not settle, the case continues in
the court system. Depending on the extent of science and medical expertise
required to try the client’s case, going to trial may not cost the plaintiff (and
his or her counsel) much relative to the potential recovery. As a one-off
case, it may be highly cost effective for the defendant to reach an
expeditious settlement. Thus, the client’s decision to decline a settlement
offer does not disadvantage the client in any way relative to his or her
position if the defendant had not made the offer to settle.
In contrast, a client who is considering declining a settlement offer made
as part of an aggregate settlement may face only unattractive options. As
one among hundreds or thousands, the client will have little bargaining
power with the defendant. Assuming the aggregate settlement goes
forward, the defendant will have resolved virtually all the pending cases,
and the attendant cloud on its share price (if a publicly traded company)
will have lifted.33 The defendant will not be overly concerned with the
outlier nonsettling claimant. If that claimant hopes to go to trial, any trial
date may be years off and the anticipated cost of litigating his or her
science- or medicine-intensive case may exceed $250,000. Even a claimant
with a strong claim may have difficulty finding a contingent fee lawyer
eager to gamble that much money and time on the client’s case.34 In
addition, the judge in any future trial may be especially unenthusiastic
about trying the case. The judge may want to know why the claimant was
unsatisfied with a settlement that so many others found acceptable. In sum,
the unattractiveness of the various options available to the client who
chooses to decline an offer under an aggregate settlement may result in
relatively few such clients declining their offers. And this in turn increases
the likelihood that even a very high participation threshold will be met.
B. Plaintiffs’ Attorney Will Recommend Participation
in the Settlement to All Clients
A second provision one would find in the optimally comprehensive
settlement agreement is an affirmation that the signatory plaintiffs’ counsel
will be recommending participation in the settlement to all the covered
clients. In many confidential inventory settlement agreements, this
provision states that “Claimants Counsel . . . have reviewed the provisions
of this Agreement, have concluded that it is in the best interests of the
Claimants” and therefore “warrant that they will recommend to each of the
Claimants that they settle their [claims] under the terms of this

Litigating the mass tort case will typically involve a great deal of scientific or medical
expertise and the testimony of numerous expensive experts.
33. See, e.g., Berenson, Analysts, supra note 1.
34. The claimant’s original lawyer may have no difficulty obtaining judicial permission
to withdraw from the client’s case if the claimant declines the settlement offer. See infra Part
II.E.
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Agreement.”35 In the public Vioxx settlement agreement, the language was
essentially the same but took into account the more complex procedures of
that nationwide settlement: “By submitting an Enrollment Form, the
Enrolling Counsel affirms that he has recommended, or . . . will
recommend . . . to 100% of the Eligible Claimants represented by such
Enrolling Counsel that such Eligible Claimants enroll in the Program.”36
This provision in the Vioxx settlement agreement has been criticized as
ethically problematic by legal scholars as well as by one state bar ethics
committee.37 Most criticisms have focused on a perceived tension with
Rule 2.1, which states: “In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise
independent professional judgment and render candid advice.”38 Many of
these criticisms, however, are based on an incomplete understanding of the
Vioxx settlement agreement, a misunderstanding of the provision itself, or
both. And the remaining criticisms are not persuasive.
To begin, consider a hypothetical offer by a defendant to settle a
plaintiffs’ lawyer’s entire group of 1,000 cases pursuant to an agreement
that specifies the individual settlement offer values in a matrix. Imagine
that the defendant offers this to the plaintiffs’ lawyer as a take-it-or-leave-it
deal and includes a provision that the plaintiffs’ lawyer must recommend
the settlement to all her clients. The plaintiffs’ lawyer finds the matrix
values fair, with the exception of one category, involving two claimants,
which the lawyer believes is undervalued by approximately $30,000 per
claimant. Despite the plaintiffs’ lawyer’s continued negotiation efforts, the
defendant is not willing to change those or any other of the matrix values.
Imagine further that to try any of the 1,000 cases would cost the plaintiffs’
lawyer approximately $250,000 and that, even if victorious at trial, the two
claimants in question are highly unlikely to net more for their claim than the
amount they would net—with certainty and much sooner—under the
imperfect proposed settlement agreement.
Under this hypothetical scenario, the plaintiffs’ lawyer would, in theory,
be free to decline the settlement offer. But one would expect the plaintiffs’
lawyer to agree to the proposed settlement notwithstanding her view that it
undervalues the claims of two of her clients. One would also expect the
plaintiffs’ lawyer to tell those two clients that she wishes they were being
offered more under the settlement matrix, that she tried to get them more,
but that the defendant was unyielding, and that she nonetheless
recommends that they accept their settlement offer given the alternatives.
Critically, the plaintiffs’ lawyer would explain to the two clients that
continuing to prosecute their case in the court system would certainly
involve additional expense and delay, with no assurance of a better net
outcome than the present settlement offer and some possibility of a worse
outcome. In addition, the plaintiffs’ lawyer would detail for the clients the
35. See, e.g., AMS Settlement, supra note 8, at 6.
36. Vioxx Settlement, supra note 7, § 1.2.8.1.
37. See generally Conn. Bar Ass’n, Informal Op. 08-01 (2008); Erichson & Zipursky,
supra note 2.
38. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
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risks and economics of any eventual trial, all of which, upon careful
consideration, have caused the lawyer to conclude that accepting the
current, flawed settlement offer is still each client’s best option.
The Vioxx settlement agreement offered each plaintiffs’ lawyer a choice
very similar to that faced by the plaintiffs’ lawyer in the preceding
hypothetical. It was left to each plaintiffs’ lawyer to decide whether she
could in good faith recommend participation in the nationwide Vioxx
settlement program to each of her clients. A plaintiffs’ lawyer who felt that
she could not recommend participation to all her clients was free to reject
the settlement offer and to not enroll her clients in the settlement.39 Thus, a
plaintiffs’ lawyer who did agree to the settlement, and who was therefore
committing to recommend that each of her clients participate in the
settlement, had no reason to run afoul of Rule 2.1. Prior to agreeing to the
settlement, that lawyer would have already determined that an exercise of
independent professional judgment on behalf of each of her clients would
enable her to recommend that they each participate in the settlement. The
key question here is, “As compared to what?” A lawyer who agreed to the
settlement need only be of the view that for each of her clients, participation
in the settlement is (reasonably likely) to be as good as any of the available
alternatives. The lawyer need not believe that the settlement will be the
best possible settlement for each of her clients to be able to recommend in
good faith that each client participate. The lawyer is free to, and would be
expected to, give each individual client “candid advice” regarding the
settlement,40 as well to explain the settlement to each client “to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.”41 The fact that the lawyer’s bottom-line
recommendation to each client is the same—to participate in the
settlement—does not mean that the lawyer did not “exercise independent
professional judgment” on behalf of each client in deciding whether she
could in fact recommend the settlement to each of them.42
When the Connecticut Bar Association’s Committee on Professional
Ethics (“the Connecticut Committee”) took up the provision in the Vioxx
settlement agreement, it began by describing the provision as one that
“compels plaintiffs’ counsel to give the same advice to all of her clients.”43
The provision does indeed require that the plaintiffs’ attorney give the same
bottom-line recommendation to each client: that the client participate in the
39. Because the Vioxx settlement agreement was public, however, potentially eligible
claimants would necessarily know about it and could simply fire their lawyer and participate
in the settlement pro se. See Vioxx Settlement, supra note 7, § 1.6. In addition, even a
lawyer who declined the offer would seemingly still be obligated to inform her clients about
the settlement, pursuant to her communication obligations under Rule 1.4. See MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 cmt. 2 (noting that “a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel
an offer of settlement in a civil controversy . . . must promptly inform the client of its
substance”).
40. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1.
41. Id. r. 1.4(b).
42. Id. r. 2.1.
43. Conn. Bar Ass’n, Informal Op. 08-01, at 1 (2008) (discussing obligations of
plaintiffs’ counsel under a particular aggregate settlement agreement).
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settlement.44 But it does not preclude the attorney from providing each
client “candid advice” regarding the settlement. Such candid advice might
include setting out the advantages and disadvantages of an individual
client’s participation relative to the alternatives or even stating that the
lawyer does not think the settlement matrix treats a particular client fairly
but that participation in the settlement is nonetheless the client’s best path
in the foreseeable future to receiving reasonable compensation for his or her
claims.
The Connecticut Committee contended that “the agreement restricts the
advice [the lawyer] can give: either recommend that all clients accept the
settlement or that none of them accept it.”45 This seems to envision that all
plaintiffs’ attorneys must participate in the settlement and then comply with
each of its requirements including the “universal recommendation”
provision. But this is not what the Vioxx settlement agreement requires or
how it operates. As in the hypothetical above, a plaintiffs’ attorney must
first decide if she can agree to the settlement at all. Given the universal
recommendation provision, the attorney must first determine whether she
can recommend the settlement to each of her clients based on an exercise of
her independent professional judgment with regard to each client.46 An
attorney who does not believe that she can comply with this (or any other)
provision of the settlement will simply not agree to the settlement, and, in
that event, the settlement agreement will not in any way “restrict the advice
she can give” her clients. In sum, the provision does not improperly restrict
the advice the attorney can give her clients; it simply imposes a condition
on the attorney’s acceptance of the settlement.

44. See Vioxx Settlement, supra note 7, § 1.2.7.
45. Conn. Bar Ass’n, Informal Op. 08-01, at 3.
46. The unusual structure of the Vioxx settlement and the length of the settlement
agreement may have resulted in an unusually large number of plaintiffs’ attorneys—and the
Connecticut Committee—not fully understanding what the settlement agreement required of
plaintiffs’ attorneys. Thus, on January 17, 2008, some two months after the November 9,
2007 settlement agreement was signed and one month before the Connecticut Committee
issued its February 20, 2008 informal opinion, the defendant (Merck) and the negotiating
plaintiffs’ counsel executed an “Amendment to Settlement Agreement.” Amendment to
Settlement Agreement, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-md-1657 (E.D. La. Jan. 17,
2008), http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Amendments%20to%20Master%
20Settlement%20Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RWX-FRWN]. The purpose of the
amendment was to “make certain technical and clarifying amendments to the Settlement
Agreement . . . to ensure that the document accurately and clearly reflects the Parties’
original intent.” Id. Recital C. Section 1.2.2 of the amendment undertook to clarify the
universal recommendation provision of the settlement agreement (section 1.2.8.1) by
restating it as follows:
Each Enrolling Counsel is expected to exercise his or her independent judgment in
the best interest of each client individually before determining whether to
recommend enrollment in the Program. By submitting an Enrollment Form, the
Enrolling Counsel affirms that he or she has exercised such independent judgment
and either (1) has recommended to 100% of the Eligible Claimants represented by
such Enrolling Counsel that such Eligible Claimants enroll in the Program or
(2) . . . will [make such a recommendation] by no later than February 28,
2008 . . . .
Id. § 1.2.2.
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Professors Howard Erichson and Benjamin Zipursky also found the
universal recommendation provision troubling.47 They acknowledged, “In
theory, a lawyer could determine that the overall settlement and its
allocation process are satisfactory for all Vioxx claimants and, on that basis,
sincerely recommend the settlement to each of her clients.”48 Indeed, this is
a fully accurate statement of how, I believe, the parties to the Vioxx
settlement agreement imagined the thought process of a plaintiffs’ attorney
when considering whether to participate in the settlement. Erichson and
Zipursky are nonetheless troubled by the provision:
In practice, however, one wonders how a lawyer would handle clients
whose claims may be undervalued by the point-allocation system, or
whose claims would provoke unusually strong jury sympathy, or who
would make uncommonly strong witnesses, or who have high risk
tolerance, or who place significant value on the right to go to trial, or who
for any other reason might be well advised to decline the settlement.49

There are two obvious responses to Erichson and Zipursky’s concerns.
First, by their own (correct) account of the universal recommendation
provision, a lawyer need only “determine that the overall settlement and its
allocation process are satisfactory” and not that each client’s settlement
offer under the agreement is ideal.50 Thus, the lawyer might consider a
particular claimant’s settlement offer to be suboptimal because she believes
the claim is undervalued by the point-allocation system or for any other
reason, yet the lawyer might still conclude that, all things considered, the
offer is “satisfactory” and recommend that the client accept it.
Second, the lawyer’s assessment of whether a particular client’s
settlement offer is satisfactory is necessarily a relative judgment, which
must take into account not only the gross dollar amount of the offer but also
the absence of risk, speed of payment, and litigation expenses to be
deducted from that offer relative to either a later potential settlement or
trial. In the context of the Vioxx settlement, for example, it merits
particular note that any eventual trial would involve significant medical and
scientific expertise and could be expected to cost $250,000 or more. Some
or all of these litigation expenses would be deducted from the client’s share
of any eventual recovery (assuming a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
survived all appeals). Thus, any future recovery would need to be both
significantly larger than the offer under the settlement agreement (and have
a very high likelihood of being obtained) for the client eventually to net
more than would be the case under the settlement agreement.

47. Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 283 & n.74. It should be noted that only the
Liptak article of the sources cited postdates the January 2008 clarifying amendment. For
other criticisms of this provision of the settlement, see Erichson, supra note 15, at 1000–04.
48. Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 284 (emphasis added). Erichson and Zipursky
are importantly correct in positing a standard of “satisfactory” rather than, say, “best
possible” for the plaintiffs’ attorney’s evaluation of the settlement and therefore whether she
can recommend it to each of her clients.
49. Id.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
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Moreover, a client’s risk of obtaining no recovery at all can be
significant. In the Vioxx settlement, for example, the template cover letter
for attorneys who agreed to the settlement to provide their clients when
explaining and recommending the settlement included sobering information
about the very mixed results of the sixteen trials to that date and about a
then-pending U.S. Supreme Court case that could “limit the ability of
plaintiffs to recover against drug companies if a drug has been approved for
marketing by the FDA.”51 In addition, one wonders about the likelihood
that a court would be willing to try the case of a plaintiff who opted out of
the nationwide settlement program, or the likelihood that the defendant
would be willing to provide a more generous settlement offer to such an
opt-out client, given the comprehensiveness of the nationwide settlement
program and the fact that it was crafted with the implicit consent of the four
judges in whose courts more than 95 percent of the active plaintiffs’ cases
were coordinated.52
C. Plaintiffs’ Attorney Will Not Represent
Any New Clients with Similar Claims
A third provision one might expect to be included in an optimally
comprehensive settlement agreement is an affirmation by plaintiffs’ counsel
51. Client Cover Letter, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-md-1657 (E.D. La. Nov.
9, 2007), http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Client%20Cover%20Letter%
20-%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/YF6D-L68K]. The template letter to clients stated:
• To date, throughout the country, there have been 16 Vioxx trials involving 17
plaintiffs. Of these trials, plaintiffs have won 5, Merck has won 7, and the
remaining 5 are awaiting a new trial. Merck has appealed each of the five cases in
which the plaintiff was victorious, and all of those appeals are still pending.
• To date, not even the five plaintiffs with hard fought victories against Merck at
trial have received any money from Merck. The first verdict in favor of a plaintiff
was in August 2005, more than two years ago. Merck has not yet paid a single
dollar of that verdict and has no legal obligation to do so unless and until all
appeals are exhausted and the verdict in favor of the plaintiff is upheld.
Id.
52. The Vioxx settlement agreement stated that Merck was confronting approximately
47,000 filed claims nationwide, along with approximately 13,250 claims on tolling
agreements. Vioxx Settlement, supra note 7, Recital B. It then listed the four “Coordinated
Proceedings” in which “[m]ore than 95% of the active plaintiffs are presently coordinated”:
the federal multidistrict litigation (MDL No. 1657), venued in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana (Judge Eldon E. Fallon); the California proceedings (JCCP No.
4247), venued in the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County (Judge Victoria G.
Chaney); the New Jersey proceedings (Case Nos. 619 and 273), venued in the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County (Judge Carol E. Higbee); and the Texas
proceedings (No. 2005-59599), venued in the District Court of Harris County, Texas (Judge
Randy Wilson). Id. Recital D.
Each of these four judges issued an order staying proceedings in their respective
courts in light of the nationwide resolution program, and each subsequently issued an order
requiring the registration of claims, consistent with the settlement agreement. See Vioxx
Settlement Documents, OFFICIAL VIOXX SETTLEMENT, http://www.officialvioxx
settlement.com/documents/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/KZ2C-EAHX]. In
addition, Judge Fallon “agreed to preside over the [settlement] Program” and serve as its
“Chief Administrator.” Vioxx Settlement, supra note 7, § 6.1.1. Each of the three state court
judges had an explicit role to play regarding the eventual allocation of the “Settlement Fee
and Cost Account.” Id. § 9.2.3.
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that they will not represent new clients for the purpose of bringing similar
claims against the defendant. Such a provision, however, clearly runs afoul
of the plain language of Rule 5.6, which states in relevant part that “a
lawyer shall not participate in offering or making . . . an agreement in which
a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the settlement of a
client controversy.”53 Comment 2 elaborates that this provision “prohibits a
lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in connection with
settling a claim on behalf of a client.”54
Prior to 1970, such provisions were unproblematic under the equivalent
to current Rule 5.6.55 Since the adoption of the Rule’s current wording,
courts and scholars have continued to debate the actual and appropriate
scope of the Rule’s prohibition and the justifications for it.56 The leading
ABA formal ethics opinion regarding the Rule explicitly acknowledges the
premium that a defendant would pay plaintiffs and their counsel for such a
provision57 but concludes Rule 5.6(b) mandates that “a lawyer cannot agree
to refrain from representing present or future clients against a defendant
pursuant to a settlement agreement on behalf of current clients even in the
mass tort, global settlement context.”58 In a 1993 ethics opinion, the ABA
stated that the policy justification for the Rule “is clear,” and the ABA
reaffirmed those policy concerns in a 2000 opinion59:
First, permitting such agreements restricts the access of the public to
lawyers who, by virtue of their background and experience, might be the
very best available talent to represent these individuals. Second, the use
of such agreements may provide clients with rewards that bear less
relationship to the merits of their claims than they do to the desire of the
defendant to “buy off” plaintiff’s counsel. Third, the offering of such

53. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
54. Id. r. 5.6 cmt. 2.
55. See Stephen Gillers & Richard W. Painter, Free the Lawyers: A Proposal to Permit
No-Sue Promises in Settlement Agreements, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 295–97 (2005)
(detailing the historical evolution of current Rule 5.6).
56. See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 285 (“To be sure, Rule 5.6(b) is itself
controversial.”); Gillers & Painter, supra note 55, at 296–302; David Luban, Settlements and
the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2624 (1995) (“The ban on lawyer
buyout is virtually the only piece of the ethics codes that recognizes that accumulated legal
skills are a public good that should not be squandered on a single favorable settlement.”); see
also Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 338, 341–46 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (expressing doubt about rationale for the prohibition of no-sue agreements, at least
where there is “no threat to the public’s unfettered right to counsel”); Feldman v. Minars,
658 N.Y.S.2d 614, 617 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that “an agreement by counsel not to
represent similar plaintiffs in similar actions against a contracting party is not against the
public policy of the State of New York”); Stephen Gillers, A Rule Without a Reason: Let the
Market, Not the Bar, Regulate Settlements That Restrict Practice, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at
118.
57. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-371, at 2 (1993)
(acknowledging “the fact that the defendant is willing to offer more consideration than it
might otherwise offer in order to secure the covenant from the attorney not to represent other
present clients as well as future claimants”).
58. Id.
59. Id.; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 00417 (2000) (discussing settlement terms limiting a lawyer’s use of information).
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restrictive agreements places the plaintiff’s lawyer in a situation where
there is conflict between the interests of present clients and those of
potential future clients. While the Model Rules generally require that the
client’s interests be put first, forcing a lawyer to give up future
representations may be asking too much, particularly in light of the strong
countervailing policy favoring the public’s unfettered choice of counsel.60

These policy arguments for the Rule continue to be controversial.61
Given the obvious benefits to both sides of including so-called “no sue”
provisions in certain settlement agreements, defendants and plaintiffs’
lawyers have long sought to work around the restrictions imposed by Rule
5.6(b). One approach has been for a defendant, moments after executing a
settlement agreement with a plaintiffs’ lawyer to resolve her clients’ claims,
to enter into a consulting agreement with that lawyer.62 In this way, the
defendant becomes the lawyer’s new client and conflict rules will prevent
the lawyer from bringing similar, future claims against the defendant.63
Numerous courts and state bar associations, however, have condemned such
agreements and have imposed sanctions including disbarment, suspensions,
and significant monetary penalties on the attorneys on both sides.64
Perhaps the most popular approach in recent years has been the use in
settlement agreement of “no present intention” language along the
following lines:
While nothing in the . . . Agreement is intended to operate as a restriction
on the right of the Claimants Counsel to practice law within the meaning
of Rule 5.6(b) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct . . . the
Claimants Counsel represent that they have no present intent to solicit or
represent new clients for the purpose of bringing [similar] Claims.65

A statement that the claimants’ law firm “has no present intent” to do
something is importantly different, as a legal matter, from an agreement or
promise by the firm not to do something in the future. To date, two courts
have explicitly found such language in settlement agreements ethically
unproblematic on the ground that an affirmation of “no present intention” to
do something is not “an agreement but merely an attempt by one
negotiating party to achieve finality through the settlement.”66 Although
60. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-371, at 2; see also
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 00-417.
61. See, e.g., Gillers & Painter, supra note 55, at 307–19 (presenting arguments for
prohibiting no-sue agreements and responses to them).
62. See id. at 309–10.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Adams v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., No. 96-2473-CIV, 2001 WL
34032759 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2001); In re Hager, 812 A.2d 904 (D.C. App. 2002); Fla. Bar v.
St. Louis, 967 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 2007); In re Brandt, 10 P.3d 906 (Or. 2000).
65. See AMS Settlement, supra note 8, at 20 (emphasis added).
66. Desantis v. Snap-On Tools Co., No. 06-cv-2231 (DMC), 2006 WL 3068584, at *12
(D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2006) (emphasis added) (holding also that a provision of a settlement
agreement stating that counsel “had no present intention of representing any persons who are
not Class Members with respect to defendants” and “does not restrict [counsel’s] right to
represent any future clients”); La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Black, No. 9410-VCN,
2016 WL 790898, at *5 & n.37 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 2016) (citing Desantis approvingly and
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unsurprising, these holdings raise the question of why a defendant cares to
include such language in the settlement agreement if it has no legal force.
One possibility is that Wall Street might (mis)interpret the language to
impose a legally enforceable limit on the defendant’s potential liability,
thereby benefitting the company’s share price. Another possibility is that
the language has actual in terrorem force in the small world of repeat
players among both defense counsel (and their clients) and plaintiffs’
counsel.67 Whatever the reasons, such language is increasingly common in
settlement agreements. And if the de facto effect of such language is
identical to the prohibited language, one wonders if the “finality premium”
paid by defendants for the “no present intention” language is comparable.
That is, perhaps Rule 5.6(b) results in a subsidy of sorts to defendants if the
“no present intention” language, which is the best one can do under the
current rules, reduces the premium they must pay the plaintiffs (and their
counsel) for finality comparable to what might be achieved with the
prohibited language.
D. Plaintiffs’ Attorney Will Not Advertise
for New Clients with Similar Claims
A related provision one might expect to find in an optimally
comprehensive settlement agreement is an affirmation by the plaintiffs’
counsel that they will take down and cease all advertising in any and all
media for new clients with similar claims against the defendant. Whether
such a provision runs afoul of Rule 5.6(b) will depend on whether
advertising by plaintiffs’ lawyers is considered part of the practice of law
such that a restriction on advertising for certain new clients is considered an
impermissible “restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice.”68
The state bar ethics committees of Texas and South Carolina have held
that advertising and solicitation are “protected under the umbrella of ‘a
lawyer’s right to practice law.’”69 In 1995, the Texas Bar Professional
Ethics Committee held:
Solicitation generally describes conduct by an attorney or a third person
acting for an attorney, which specifically targets potential clients, with the
intent of pecuniary gain. To the extent that such is permitted under the
State Bar Rules, and other applicable state and federal statutes, solicitation
distinguishing as a violation of Rule 5.6(b) a straightforward promise by plaintiffs’ counsel
not to initiate litigation against the defendant in the future, “because it involves a prospective
guarantee not to represent future clients, the violation of which would . . . terminate the
deal”).
67. This is the answer I received in a May 2016 conversation with an attorney who has
years of experience as outside counsel to defendants in various mass tort settlements.
68. Rule 5.6(b) states in relevant part that a “lawyer shall not participate in offering or
making . . . an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the
settlement of a client controversy.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6(b) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2016).
69. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 10-04, (2010); Tex. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op.
505 (1995); cf. Tex. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 590 (2009) (“The conclusion that solicitation
of clients, to the extent permitted by applicable disciplinary rules and other law, is an
appropriate part of the practice of law was affirmed in Opinion 505.”).
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is part of the practice of law and therefore cannot be more severely
restricted in a settlement agreement tha[n] it is restricted in the Rules and
applicable law.
....
A settlement agreement which exceeds current limitations placed on
solicitation would be a limitation on the practice of law and therefore a
violation of [the Texas equivalent to ABA Rule 5.6(b)].70

In 2010, the South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee cited the
1995 Texas ethics opinion in reaching the same conclusion that its “Rule
5.6(b) precludes contracting away rights associated with the practice of law,
among them the right to advertise one’s services.”71 In light of these
decisions, defendants and plaintiffs’ lawyers have arrived at a work-around
similar to that for the “no new client” restrictions discussed in the preceding
section:
[W]hile nothing in this Agreement is intended to operate as a “restriction”
on the right of Claimants’ Counsel to practice law within the meaning of
the [relevant state(s)’] equivalent to Rule 5.6(b) of the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct[,] . . . Claimants’ Counsel represents that
Claimants’ Counsel has removed, dismantled, or discontinued, and has no
present intention to create in the future, any advertisements for clients
relating to [claims involving Product X].72

The “no present intention” statement within this provision is permissible
for the reasons discussed above.73 The statement that the claimants’ law
firm “has removed, dismantled, or discontinued” all advertisements for
clients with claims involving “Product X” is ethically unproblematic
because it is simply a statement of fact regarding past actions voluntarily
70. Tex. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 505. The question presented to the Texas
Professional Ethics Committee was, “Would a violation of Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct occur if a law firm agreed, as part of the settlement of a lawsuit, not to
solicit third parties in the future to prosecute claims against the opposing party?” Id. This is
a broader, and therefore potentially more problematic, restriction than the one discussed in
this Article. In framing its discussion, however, the committee took a more narrow
approach:
Under [the Texas equivalent to ABA Rule 5.6(b)], the key issue is whether or not a
settlement agreement such as this would in any way prevent a lawyer from
representing another person. Generally, it seems that the intent of [this] clause[]
would be exactly that: to limit an attorney from representing a client similarly
situated in a matter against the opposing party.
Id.
71. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 10-04. The “proposed limitation in this
settlement” was that “Lawyer A, the lawyer for the plaintiff, agree that Lawyer A may not
identify or use the defendant’s name for ‘commercial or commercially-related publicity
purposes.’ Lawyer A may identify generally ‘a settlement was achieved against an
industry’—i.e.: trucking or retail store.” Id.
The South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee’s mention of Bates v. Arizona,
433 U.S. 350 (1977), is both apt and ironic. Prior to that U.S. Supreme Court decision, state
bars routinely prohibited virtually all attorney advertising. Thus, with the South Carolina
and Texas ethics opinions, we have gone full circle, from attorney advertising essentially not
being permitted to advertising become a constitutional right that the attorney cannot waive.
72. Confidential Master Settlement Agreement (emphasis added) (on file with author);
cf, e.g., AMS Settlement, supra note 8, at 20.
73. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
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taken by the firm. As with the “no present intention” language discussed in
Part II.C, one is left to wonder why defendants are concerned to include
language in the settlement agreement that has no legal force. If the de facto
effect of such language is the same as for the language prohibited by Rule
5.6(b), one also wonders if the “finality premium” paid by defendants for
the “no present intention” language is comparable.
E. Plaintiffs’ Attorney Will Undertake to Withdraw
from Representing Clients Who Decline Their Settlement Offer
A final provision one might expect to find in an optimally comprehensive
settlement agreement is an affirmation by claimants’ counsel that they will
take “all necessary steps to disengage and withdraw from the
representation” of any claimant who declines his or her settlement offer.74
The Vioxx settlement agreement included a variant of this provision, which
was highly controversial.75 Some of the controversy seemed to result from
misreading and mischaracterizing the provision as a “mandatory
withdrawal” provision.76 The Vioxx provision explicitly included the
obvious implicit constraint that this obligation of claimants’ counsel existed
only “to the extent permitted by the equivalents to Rules 1.16 and 5.6 of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct in the relevant
jurisdiction(s).”77 Rule 1.16 is doing the primary work here insofar as it
limits the circumstances under which a lawyer may ethically seek to
withdraw from representing a client and sets out the procedures the attorney
must follow to do so. To begin, Rule 1.16(c) requires a lawyer in a filed
case to “comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a
tribunal when terminating a representation” and it further obligates the
lawyer to “continue representation notwithstanding good cause for
terminating the representation” if “ordered to do so by a tribunal.”78 Thus,
an attorney cannot simply unilaterally withdraw from a filed case.
In addition, Rule 1.16(b) requires that the attorney have “good cause” for
seeking to withdraw, and sets out various circumstances that would meet
this requirement. The two circumstances most likely to be relevant in a
mass tort context, such as the Vioxx settlement, are when “the client insists
upon taking action . . . with which the lawyer has a fundamental
disagreement” and when “the representation will result in an unreasonable
74. See, e.g., Vioxx Settlement, supra note 7, § 1.2.8.2.
75. See id. For concurrent commentary critical of this provision, see, e.g., Erichson &
Zipursky, supra note 2, at 281 n.74 (citing sources); see also, e.g., Conn. Bar Ass’n, Informal
Op. 08-01, at 1 (2008); Nancy J. Moore, Ethical Issues in Mass Tort Plaintiffs’
Representation: Beyond the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3233 (2013).
76. Even commentators such as Erichson and Zipursky, who clearly appreciated the
careful wording of the provision and its implications, repeatedly referred to the provision as
the “mandatory-withdrawal provision” and stated that “participating lawyers were
obligated . . . to withdraw from representing clients who refused the settlement.” Erichson &
Zipursky, supra note 2, at 283. “Mandatory” withdrawal is not even logically possible if a
case has been filed, given the need for notice to the court and court approval. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
77. See Vioxx Settlement, supra note 7, § 1.2.8.2.
78. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(c).
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financial burden on the lawyer.”79 Some scholars have argued that a
qualifying “fundamental disagreement” does not exist when the lawyer
fundamentally disagrees with the client’s decision to reject the settlement.80
They contend that to hold otherwise would be to “assume the settlement
decision belongs to the lawyer despite Rule 1.2(a)’s clear instruction that
the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision whether to accept or reject a
settlement.”81 There are two problems with this argument. First, a lawyer
who seeks permission from a court to withdraw from representing a client
who has declined a settlement offer has not usurped the client’s decision
whether to settle. The client has chosen not to settle and the lawyer has not
in any way overridden that decision. Second, the mandate of Rule 1.2(a)
that the lawyer “abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter”82
does not require that the lawyer continue to represent a client who declines
a settlement offer; rather, it requires that the lawyer not settle the client’s
case without the client’s permission, and the lawyer seeking permission
from the court to withdraw from representing the client has not done so.
Scholars such as Erichson and Zipursky, who contend that the
withdrawal provision of the Vioxx settlement agreement is ethically
impermissible, note in further support of their position that “[c]ases
overwhelmingly reject the idea that a lawyer may fire a client for declining
a settlement against the lawyer’s advice.”83 The mass tort context,
however, is distinguishable in several relevant respects: (1) the attorney is
working on a contingent fee and typically is advancing all litigation
expenses on behalf of the client with no risk to the client; (2) the settlement
offer which the client has chosen to decline may be the best net result the
attorney reasonably believes he or she can obtain through settlement for the
client in the foreseeable future; and (3) the expected value of the client’s
case at trial, even with a favorable verdict, might be too low even to cover
the cost of the trial.
Put differently, in a mass tort context, such as the Vioxx settlement,
continuing to represent a nonsettling claimant may well impose “an
unreasonable financial burden” on the contingent fee claimant’s counsel,
justifying withdrawal under Rule 1.16(b)(6). Erichson and Zipursky
acknowledge that “[c]ompared with the certainty of payout under Merck’s
settlement program, plaintiffs’ lawyers might regard bringing a [Vioxx]
case to trial as a highly questionable investment.”84 In their view, however,
this is not a sufficient basis on which such attorneys can seek withdrawal,
79. Id. r. 1.16(b)(4), (b)(6). Other provisions, including 1.16(b)(1) and 1.16(b)(7) might
also be relevant in many circumstances.
80. See, e.g., Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 287.
81. Id. Erichson is also concerned that a lawyer withdrawing if the client declines a
settlement offer means that the client’s informed consent to settlement offer is meaningless:
“they essentially had no real choice.” Erichson, supra note 15, at 1019. The client does have
the choice to find another lawyer, however. And if the client cannot find another lawyer to
take his case, it may mean the client is being unreasonable in declining the settlement offer.
82. MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a).
83. Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 287.
84. Id. at 289.

1964

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

because “[t]he lawyers did not limit the scope of their representation to
pursuing settlement,” a contractual limitation that they further acknowledge
might not even be permissible under Rule 1.2(c).85 In sum, notwithstanding
the plain language of Rule 1.16(b)(6), Erichson and Zipursky appear to
contend that a contingent fee attorney is obligated to lose money on behalf
of a client who declines a settlement offer and wants to pursue his or her
case to trial. The argument is not persuasive.
A few further aspects of such withdrawal provisions merit discussion.
First, insofar as “good cause” is a prerequisite under Rule 1.16 for an
attorney to (seek permission to) withdraw from a client’s (filed) case, a
claimant’s attorney is not obligated by a withdrawal provision to (seek the
court’s permission to) withdraw if the attorney does not think good cause
for withdrawal exists. For example, an attorney might believe that a
client’s settlement offer is not sufficiently large given the likelihood that the
client would prevail at trial and the expected value of the client’s case net of
the costs of trial. In that event, the attorney might consider the client’s
decision to decline the settlement offer to be entirely reasonable, and the
attorney would therefore not think good cause for withdrawal exists.
Second, even if the attorney does believe good cause exists, the court might
deny the attorney’s motion to withdraw as counsel. Thus, taking “all
necessary steps to disengage and withdraw from the representation of a
client” will not necessarily mean that the attorney will no longer represent
the client.
Finally, some critics of the Vioxx withdrawal provision have expressed
particular skepticism regarding its caveat that lawyers should undertake to
withdraw only “to the extent permitted by” Rules 1.16 and 5.6.86 Erichson
and Zipursky, for example, argue that
[i]f this language is taken seriously, . . . then neither the intent nor the
terms of the [Vioxx] agreement required counsel to withdraw from
representing clients who declined the settlement. Obedience to Rules
85. Id. Erichson and Zipursky contend:
The problem with this argument is that when the lawyer agreed to represent each
Vioxx claimant, the lawyer could not assume that Merck would offer a settlement,
and even if it did, the lawyer could not assume that the client would accept the
offer. The lawyers did not limit the scope of their representation to pursuing
settlement.
Id. With regard to the last point, they elaborate as follows:
Under Rule 1.2(c), a lawyer “may limit the scope of the representation if the
limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed
consent. . . . We doubt whether, under the circumstances of the Vioxx litigation, a
lawyer could properly limit the scope of representation so that clients understood
that the lawyer represented them solely for purposes of a possible settlement.
Without the leverage of adjudication, a lawyer could not adequately pursue the
interests of tort claimants. In any event, such limited representation is not the
scenario that the actual Vioxx case presents.
Id. at 289 n.110.
86. Vioxx Settlement, supra note 7, § 1.2.8.2. These critics include Erichson and
Zipursky who contend, among other things, that “[t]o a great extent, these clauses are
defensive verbiage, and the work they are actually supposed to do is unclear.” Erichson &
Zipursky, supra note 2, at 290.
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1.16 and 5.6 would compel plaintiffs’ counsel not to withdraw from
representing their nonsettling clients.87

As explained above, however, this is not a correct reading of Rule 1.16.
If one reads Rule 1.16(b)(6) as I set out above, it is possible for plaintiffs’
counsel to believe that “good cause” to withdraw exists insofar as continued
representation would impose an unreasonable financial burden on the
lawyer but for the lawyer nonetheless to be willing to continue the
representation. That is, having good cause to withdraw does not require
that one withdraw but makes it ethically permissible to do so.88 Thus, one
way to make sense of the caveat language that Erichson and Zipursky find
troubling is for the provision to require that a plaintiffs’ lawyer who does
have good cause to withdraw, but who is not required by Rule 1.16(a) to
withdraw, take appropriate steps to withdraw even if the lawyer might
otherwise be willing to continue the representation. Such an agreement
seems to be ethically unproblematic and likely to result in more
comprehensive closure under the settlement. For a plaintiffs’ lawyer who
does not believe that good cause exists to (request permission to) withdraw
from a representation, the caveat language should indeed provide
“contractual comfort.”89
III. COMPREHENSIVE FINALITY IN NONCLASS MASS TORTS:
A DEFENSE AND A PROPOSAL
Comprehensive finality in nonclass mass torts has clear benefits and no
significant costs for the defendants, which translates into a “finality
premium” for the plaintiffs. The issue then becomes whether such
comprehensive finality also has costs for the plaintiffs, which might exceed
the benefits of that increased compensation. Throughout the preceding
analysis of five core components of comprehensive finality in nonclass
mass tort settlements, the primary costs alleged by critics have been the
adverse effect on the autonomy and choices available to present (and future)
plaintiffs.90 The conceptions of client autonomy and choice that underlie
many of these critiques, however, seem to be derived from a model of
individual, hourly rate representation rather than a model of aggregate,
contingent fee representation. In addition, some of the claimed costs to the
plaintiffs do not seem to be a function of the comprehensiveness of the
settlement but rather of the underlying aggregation inherent in the mass
action.

87. Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 290–91.
88. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“[A] lawyer
may withdraw from representing a client if . . . good cause for withdrawal exists.” (emphasis
added)).
89. See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 291.
90. Similarly, the bad acts of various attorneys involved in nonclass aggregate
settlements, discussed in Erichson, supra note 15, at 982–1006, reflect on those particular
attorneys and not on aggregate settlements, their negotiation, or the existing ethics rules.
Many attorneys who engage in bad acts are not involved in aggregate settlements, and most
attorneys do not engage in bad acts.
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In undertaking any normative assessment of the ethics rules that do and
should govern nonclass mass tort settlements, it is critical to keep in mind
that mass actions are importantly different from individual litigation. This
distinction is rarely acknowledged in the ethics rules, which embody a
largely individualistic model of what lawyers do and who their clients are.91
In mass litigation, in which a single plaintiffs’ law firm may represent a
thousand claimants, whose cases it will move toward trial or settlement as a
block, the individual plaintiff will typically and inevitably have less
autonomy in certain respects than a plaintiff flying solo. In exchange,
however, the mass litigation claimants gain several important advantages by
prosecuting their claims collectively. These include increased leverage in
settlement negotiations, economies of scale in litigation costs, equalization
of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ financial risks, and conservation of
defendants’ assets.92
In sum, the choice of baseline matters. The appropriate baseline against
which to assess the five core components of comprehensive finality
discussed in this Article is a nonclass aggregate settlement agreement,
which is identical except for the finality provision(s) at issue. When
measured against that baseline, it seems clear that the benefits of
comprehensive finality in nonclass mass tort settlements exceed the costs
for plaintiffs as well as defendants.
As the analysis in Part II has shown, three of the core components of
comprehensive finality in mass tort settlement agreements are
unproblematic under the existing ethics rules, notwithstanding the criticisms
of various commentators.93 The remaining two components in their purest
form are problematic under Rule 5.6(b), but the market has generated
“work-arounds” through the use of “no present intention” language.94
There is reason to expect, however, that these work-arounds may be costing
the plaintiffs some portion of their potentially available finality premium
and perhaps providing a windfall to the defendants.95
I therefore, propose that Rule 5.6(b) be amended to read (in relevant part)
as follows:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
....
91. The “aggregate settlement” rule, Rule 1.8, is the best—and perhaps only—example
of an existing Rule that acknowledges the differences between individual and mass litigation
and settlements. See MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(g).
92. Silver & Baker, supra note 2, at 744.
93. These core provisions are the minimum participation thresholds and affirmations by
plaintiffs’ counsel that they will recommend participation in the settlement to all eligible
clients and will (seek judicial permission to) withdraw from representing any client who
declines his or her settlement offer. See supra Part II.A–B, E.
94. These core provisions are the affirmations by plaintiffs’ counsel that they will cease
advertising for new clients with similar claims against the defendant and will not represent
any new, similar claimants. See supra Part II.C–D.
95. Given the role of repeat play in enforcing the current work-around language, the
question arises of how large the windfall to defendants might be and how much the plaintiffs
would gain by relaxing the restrictions of current Rule 5.6. An amendment would certainly
increase clarity and its associated benefits.
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(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is
part of the settlement of a matter, except that a lawyer may include in such
an agreement a promise not to represent, or advertise for, new clients in
matters arising out of the same transaction or event as the settled matter.

A formal Comment to the Rule would specify that a lawyer is not
obligated to include such a promise simply because a client or defendant
requests it. A second Comment would require that any supplemental
compensation to be paid by the defendant in exchange for the lawyer’s
promise must be included in the total settlement payment to be made for the
covered clients’ claims.
This amendment and the first Comment are similar to, but importantly
different from, those proposed by Stephen Gillers and Richard Painter.96
Although I share many of the concerns that motivate their proposal for
relaxing the existing prohibitions of Rule 5.6(b), I am eager to avoid any
side payments to the lawyer in exchange for “no-sue” or “no-advertising”
restrictions. My concern is to minimize any incentive for the lawyer to
lowball the settlement value of the client’s claims to obtain a larger side
payment for herself.97 A restriction that would permit the lawyer to
negotiate a personal side payment from the defendant in exchange for a nosue promise, but “only after the terms of the plaintiff’s settlement are set,”98
does not provide sufficient safeguards in this respect.99 Indeed, such a
limitation seems to be little different than the frequently condemned
practice of a defendant negotiating a consulting arrangement with a
plaintiffs’ lawyer promptly after negotiating an agreement to settle the
claims of that lawyer’s clients.100 Under either scenario, one is left to
wonder whether some (or all) of the defendant’s separate payment to the
attorney would have been included in her clients’ total settlement value in
the absence of the “later negotiated” side agreement. Thus, the better
option is to require any no-sue or no-advertising restriction to be included
in the mass tort settlement agreement and for the value of such restrictions
to be similarly included in the total settlement value of the covered clients’
claims, thereby providing the finality premium to both the settling claimants
and their lawyer.

96. See Gillers & Painter, supra note 55, at 319.
97. This amendment might also be expected to improve perceptions of attorney loyalty
relative to the lawyer changing sides, as well as difficult questions about when exactly
negotiations regarding the lawyer’s separate side payment began.
98. Gillers & Painter, supra note 55, at 320. Gillers and Painter are also willing to have
the attorney renegotiate the fee to be paid by the clients in light of a no-sue promise
negotiated between the attorney and the defendant. See id. This option is even more rife
with problems and should not be permitted.
99. Among other things, it seems too easy for the defendant and the plaintiffs’ lawyer to
anticipate such a “later” negotiation and to plan accordingly when setting the settlement
value of the clients’ claims, even if nothing is said by either party until after the agreement to
settle the clients’ claims is signed.
100. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Both for plaintiffs and defendants, the benefits of comprehensive finality
in nonclass aggregate settlements are highly likely to exceed the costs. The
existing Rules of Professional Responsibility, however, constrain rather
than facilitate the parties’ ability to craft mutually beneficial, optimally
comprehensive settlements. And the question we are left with is, “Why?”
Or, rather, “Who?”
Who benefits when Rule 5.6(b) precludes a defendant from paying a
premium to obtain straightforward, enforceable promises in an aggregate
settlement agreement that plaintiffs’ counsel will cease advertising for new
clients with similar claims against the defendant and will not represent any
new, similar claimants? And who benefits when plaintiffs (and their
counsel) are unable to reap the entire available finality premium because the
settlement agreement can employ only the work-around “no present
intention” language rather than the desired straightforward, enforceable
promises? Those critical of, and eager to restrict, the parties’ pursuit of
comprehensive finality, including those who would retain Rule 5.6(b) in its
current form, owe us answers to these questions.

